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Near East and South Asia Review

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21 June 1985

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Near East and South Asia Review ()

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Afghanistan in May

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The Soviets launched their spring offensive in May with simultaneous operations in the Konar Valley near the Pakistani border; in Ghazni, Lowgar, and Paktia Provinces in the east; and in the south, west, and north as well.

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Sudan: John Garang De Mabior—A Political Biography

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Southern insurgent leader John Garang claims to seek a secular, unified, and socialist Sudan and will not end the insurgency until the Khartoum regime restores the south's unified status, rescinds the imposition of Islamic law, and cancels the integration agreement with Egypt.

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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the authors.

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Articles

Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance: Ground and Naval Forces

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Despite intensive modernization efforts over the last 10 years, [redacted]

[redacted] Manpower shortages,

[redacted] of both the Saudi Land Forces and Naval Forces. As a result, we believe that, as in previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, in any future war Saudi Arabia would contribute only a token force of one to two Army brigades of dubious combat value and probably would avoid committing any ships of its growing but inexperienced Navy. [redacted]

Other new equipment includes TOW antitank missiles and light armored vehicles. [redacted]

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Substantial deliveries of modern equipment, however, have not overcome the Army's numerous operational, training, and logistic deficiencies. [redacted]

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The Saudi Land Forces

Previous Saudi Army contributions to Arab-Israeli conflicts have been modest, reflecting both Riyadh's limited capabilities and its unwillingness to provoke Israeli retaliation, against which the kingdom could offer little resistance. In the 1973 war, for example, the Saudis sent a reinforced infantry brigade to Syria, and they had stationed another infantry brigade in Jordan before the outbreak of the war. Fortunately for Riyadh, neither unit participated in significant fighting, but their presence demonstrated the kingdom's commitment to the Arab cause. [redacted]

Since 1973, the Army has grown steadily. It has expanded from four brigades, composed largely of light infantry, into a seven-brigade force consisting of two armored and two mechanized brigades, two infantry brigades undergoing mechanization, and an airborne/special forces brigade. The Army's firepower and mobility have been significantly upgraded since 1973 with the delivery of French and US main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 155-mm self-propelled howitzers. The Army also has improved the integral air defense capability of its brigades through the acquisition of US Vulcan 20-mm and French 30-mm self-propelled antiaircraft artillery and French Shahine surface-to-air missiles.

Manpower Problems

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Lack of sufficient Saudi manpower remains a major problem for the Army, as well as for the other Saudi military services. The government is reluctant to implement conscription. Qualified natives find the private sector more lucrative, and many Saudis accord low status to military service. As a result, the Army, which has an authorized strength of 70,000, can field only about 30,000 to 35,000 troops. According to Embassy and [redacted] most Saudi Army brigades are routinely at half strength or less. [redacted]

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One consequence of the kingdom's manpower shortage has been its growing dependence on foreign military personnel—primarily Pakistanis, who constitute one-third of the Saudi Army, or approximately 13,000 to 14,000 men. According to Embassy and [redacted] Pakistanis man one armored brigade at Tabuk with 5,000 to 6,000 troops, three artillery battalions, two construction engineer detachments, and numerous 35-mm antiaircraft batteries. The Pakistani armored brigade is

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apparently the only Saudi Army unit at or near full strength. In our estimation, it is the most effective ground unit in Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED]

The Pakistani brigade is unlikely to be available for use outside Saudi Arabia. Embassy reporting since 1983 indicates the brigade remains under the ultimate control of the Pakistani Government, with its commander required to consult with Islamabad before engaging in combat. Although Embassy sources believe the Pakistanis probably would, despite the risk of heavy losses, fight to repel an Israeli attack on Islam's holiest cities, we see virtually no chance that Islamabad would sanction deployment of the brigade to Syria or Jordan. [REDACTED]

Impact of an Expeditionary Force

Given the likely unavailability of the Pakistani brigade, the need to maintain credible forces to secure Saudi borders near Israel and opposite the Yemens, and the Army's personnel and logistic deficiencies, we estimate that the kingdom probably would deploy one mechanized brigade to Syria or Jordan during an Arab-Israeli war. The Army probably would dispatch a mechanized brigade, based at Batin or Tabuk, equipped with M-60 A1 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and M-109SP 155-mm howitzers. We believe Riyadh has sufficient transport capability and experience to move the brigade to Jordan or Syria. [REDACTED]

Riyadh also might deploy its lightly equipped, 1,500-man airborne/special forces brigade—also based at Tabuk—using the Saudi Air Force's C-130 aircraft. The Saudis transported this unit to the United Arab Emirates for Gulf Cooperation Council maneuvers in 1983, and they also employ it throughout the kingdom on internal security missions. Both the mechanized and airborne brigades are at only 40 to 50 percent of their authorized strength, although the Saudis probably would reinforce them with personnel from other units before sending them abroad. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Saudi Naval Forces

Saudi Arabia's Naval Forces pose no threat to Israel, in our view, and are unlikely to prove worrisome for Tel Aviv's military planners even in the 1990s. The Navy currently is preoccupied with the absorption of a large amount of new equipment. It received its first modern warships—13 US-built corvettes and missile boats equipped with Harpoon missiles—only in 1983 and will take delivery of four much larger French-built, guided-missile frigates in 1985-86. Although the Navy's recent exercises with Oman and Pakistan demonstrate a gradually improving operational capability, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] support them effectively, and integrate dissimilar US and French systems. [REDACTED]

The Saudis also would have difficulty employing their Navy against Israel, given Tel Aviv's small Red Sea coastline and Israel's superior maritime combat capabilities. The Saudi Navy could operate in conjunction with the Egyptian fleet in maintaining a distant blockade of Elat. Saudi warships, however, would be highly vulnerable to Israeli Air Force fighters and Navy missile boats. Unlike the Saudis, the Israelis have extensive experience in joint air/naval operations and have developed combat-proven antisurface tactics employing airstrikes, ship-launched surface-to-surface missiles, and extensive use of electronic countermeasures. [REDACTED]

A more likely mission for the Saudi Navy in a general Arab-Israeli war would be protection of the kingdom's long, vulnerable Red Sea coastline from Israeli attack. Israeli naval commandos could, for example, strike Saudi port facilities or oil installations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] To counter such attacks and reduce the risk of humiliating warship losses to Israeli forces, the Saudi Navy might concentrate near major targets along the Saudi Red Sea coast. [REDACTED]

Outlook

We believe that Riyadh's ground and naval forces will lack well into the 1990s the manpower, training, and leadership necessary to pose even a minor threat to

Israel. Scheduled deliveries and proposed acquisitions of increasingly advanced equipment, in our view, will not compensate for the substantial qualitative gap in operational effectiveness separating the Saudi Army and Navy from their counterparts in Israel. [REDACTED]

The Saudi Army plans to replace its M-60 and AMX-30 tanks with the US M-1 or a European equivalent, possibly to purchase the M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and to acquire 125 or more observation and assault helicopters to bolster Army mobility and provide improved close air support. Even if Saudi Arabia acquires all of this equipment—which is unlikely as long as oil prices remain depressed—the Army will still be unable to find sufficient manpower to crew and maintain it. Unless the Saudis decide to import more foreign troops or introduce comprehensive conscription, they are unlikely to recruit enough natives to fill the Army's ranks in the 1990s. Moreover, the Army will have to improve dramatically the frequency and realism of its field training and upgrade its logistic support to produce combat units capable of conducting effective operations against a modern army. [REDACTED]

We believe Israel is well aware of the deficiencies in the Saudi armed forces. Although Tel Aviv's opposition in principle to any transfer of advanced Western equipment to Arab states will lead it to speak out against sales of ground and naval systems to Saudi Arabia, the kingdom's severe problems in absorbing such equipment will mitigate concern among Israeli military planners about the impact on the regional balance. As a result, Israeli anxiety over the intentions of Saudi Arabia's Army and Navy during a crisis probably would not—as perhaps could be the case with Riyadh's Air Force—provoke Israeli preemptive actions against military targets in Saudi Arabia. [REDACTED]

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South Asian Nuclear Diplomacy ☐

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India and Pakistan use their nuclear programs as diplomatic tools as well as for energy and military ends. In our judgment, they see their nuclear programs as strengthening their political positions and prestige in the Nonaligned Movement and the Muslim world, respectively. Nuclear interests give the two South Asian nations the opportunity to project positions on important issues—nuclear disarmament for India and Western discrimination against Third World development aspirations for Pakistan. This diplomatic activity often works to the disadvantage of US interests in the Third World. ☐

Nuclear Agreements

Nuclear cooperation agreements, which India and Pakistan sign with some regularity, may eventually lead to their becoming second-tier suppliers of nuclear goods and services. Currently, both nations provide training services to other Third World countries, and US Embassy reporting indicates that countries such as Libya and Algeria look to South Asia to provide expertise. Although the potential supply list is not long, it is significant. Pakistan has experience in uranium enrichment technology, and India has gained extensive experience in reprocessing reactor fuel. Both countries may boast of sharing such capabilities, but they are unlikely to provide complete design and technical information. They, however, could use their experience in these technologies for concluding agreements by promising to set up research programs in uranium enrichment and reprocessing. ☐

In the last few months, India has concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with Vietnam and Cuba and has discussed nuclear matters with Peru and Mexico. These agreements include provisions for training, medical research, and agricultural applications of atomic energy and contained hints of future power projects. A nuclear agreement with Argentina exists, but we do not know the details, and the Argentines and Indians are reluctant to discuss them. Indian Department of Atomic Energy scientists and technicians worked in Libya during the last three

years, and Indian facilities are used by the International Atomic Energy Agency for training IAEA scholarship recipients and scientists. ☐

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Pakistan's nuclear cooperation agreements are primarily with Muslim countries. President Zia set the tone for cooperation in 1981 when he declared that Islamabad would make every effort to acquire nuclear technology and expertise and share it with the Islamic world:

- Agreements have been concluded with nascent nuclear countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Pakistan has agreed to assist Malaysia in establishing an atomic research center and to help both countries with their power projects.
- Pakistan is party to a tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkey that includes provisions for the exchange of scientists and assistance in developing Iran's nuclear power.
- Recently the Embassy in Tunis reported speculation about a Pakistani-Tunisian agreement that included Kuwaiti financing. Details of the agreement are unknown.

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In addition, Pakistani nuclear facilities have received students from Muslim countries, and Pakistani scientists have worked in nuclear facilities in other Muslim states. ☐

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Political Platforms

Both India and Pakistan take advantage of their political and technical credentials to promote pet ideas. India, as the leader of the Nonaligned Movement and a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, uses these forums to publicize New Delhi's

views on disarmament. Pakistan, as a technological leader of the Islamic world and member of the IAEA, uses its position to berate the Western world for withholding nuclear technology from the developing world. [redacted]

Disarmament. India has supported nuclear disarmament since the 1950s, and New Delhi's position as an advanced nuclear country puts it in a more credible position to push this view. New Delhi was host to a six-nation conference on nuclear disarmament in January 1985 that called on the superpowers to work harder to achieve that goal—a conference that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi claims the United States, in contrast to the USSR, ignored. India has also condemned the Non-Proliferation Treaty because it allows nuclear weapon states to continue with their weapon programs while denying nonweapon states unrestricted access to nuclear technology. Both positions give New Delhi a platform from which to claim moral leadership of the Nonaligned Movement. [redacted]

Technical Imperialism. Difficulties in acquiring Western nuclear assistance have led Islamabad to blame Western imperialism for stifling Third World development aspirations. According to Munir Khan, head of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, Pakistani efforts to apply nuclear technology to medicine, agriculture, and energy have been restrained because the West will not brook competition. Khan also alleges that the West uses its economic and technical leverage with developing countries to maintain political hegemony. This theme has been used with success in negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements with developing states since Pakistan can claim to be helping Muslim and Third World brethren achieve what the West would deny them. [redacted]

Islamabad also turns the technological denial theme to its advantage at home where the United States is blamed for Pakistan's current energy and water shortage. US lobbying to keep other suppliers from helping Pakistan achieve its nuclear goals has, according to Islamabad and the government-controlled Pakistani press, added to the severity of the current energy shortage. [redacted]

Implications for the United States

Pakistan and India will continue to be vocal critics of US nuclear policy with respect to both disarmament and technology transfer. The two South Asian nations' expanding networks of nuclear cooperation agreements and their positions as advanced Third World nuclear states will give them platforms from which to publicize their views as well as spread nuclear knowledge. If Indian and Pakistani views gain wider acceptance, it will become more difficult to advance US nonproliferation goals in the developing world. [redacted]

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Soviet Support for Indian Energy Projects

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The signing of a \$1.15 billion Soviet aid agreement by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Moscow last month will help sustain Indo-Soviet ties. India will benefit from cheap credit, and Moscow will reap propaganda benefits. The new aid package, which will go mainly toward energy projects, will not make India significantly more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure. Meanwhile, New Delhi will look to Western suppliers for industrial technology and equipment.

New Aid Agreement

The new aid agreement apparently marks a shift of Soviet financial support away from Indian heavy industry to energy projects. Although the text of the agreement is not available, official comment and press reports emphasize plans for thermal power stations, coal mining, and oil exploration. The only industrial component of the package is an apparently minor project to modernize a machinery factory. Some funds might also be used for a nuclear power plant that was not mentioned in official public statements but was noted in press reporting on the negotiations.

The financial terms of the new loan, which can be used only to purchase Soviet goods and services, are probably similar to past Soviet state credits—2.5-percent interest, repayable in rupees through a bilateral clearing account over 20 years, including a grace period of three years. The Indian press noted that Moscow wanted to charge 4-percent interest for a conventional electricity project.

We are not certain whether the entire package reflects a new commitment or whether it includes approximately \$500 million still undisbursed from previous Soviet aid agreements with India.

Oil and Gas Exploration

Press reports indicate that \$402 million of the credit will be used for "intensive, integrated" oil and gas exploration in two onshore blocks. New Delhi probably turned to the Soviet Union for help because it calculated that Western companies would not be

India: Soviet Aid Commitments

Million US \$

	Total	Energy	Industry	Other	Comment
1955	118		118		
1956	23	4	17	2	
1957	125	30	95		
1958	1			1	
1959	414	150	264		
1961	125	76	49		
1965	240		235	5	
1966	561	160	365	36	Partly undisbursed.
1973	330			330	
1977	340		340		Partly undisbursed.
1980	800	400	400		Substantially undisbursed.
1983	140		140		Substantially undisbursed.
Total through 1984	3,217	820	2,023	374	
1985	1,150	NA	NA	NA	

interested in a participation agreement, given that both areas require deep drilling and are relatively unpromising. Therefore, even though New Delhi must repay the Soviet loan whether or not exploitable deposits are discovered, it is better off accepting Soviet aid than financing the exploration by borrowing on harder commercial terms or increasing current government expenditures.

Moscow has long been active in the Indian petroleum sector, but in recent years it has made only a minor contribution through projects managed by Indian public-sector corporations. The new agreement will apparently be applied to projects that include surveying and drilling over the next five to seven

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years. This integrated approach will probably minimize squabbling between petroleum officials of the two governments over who is responsible for poor returns from recent Soviet drilling in India. []

Thermal Power Projects and Coal

New proposals for these sectors are similar to past Soviet assistance. The Indian press notes that Moscow has offered \$287 million for Soviet equipment for a very large, coal-based electricity plant in eastern India. Although this project has been on the two countries' agenda for several years, the current Indian Government budget does not provide funds for local costs; accordingly, construction probably will not begin in the near future. The new aid will also help finance additional open and underground mines and washeries at coalfields that already receive Soviet support. More tentative plans include smaller electricity projects, including one at a steel plant that Moscow helped establish. []

Nuclear Power

The Indians and the Soviets continued negotiations for the purchase of at least one 440-megawatt nuclear power reactor during Gandhi's trip to Moscow. According to the Indian press, New Delhi and Moscow have reached an understanding on the purchase of a light-water, graphite-moderated, and enriched uranium-fueled reactor. []

The problem of safeguards, however, which has delayed completion of negotiations for almost three years, apparently continues to hold up a final agreement. []

[] The Indian press reports that Gandhi has also had reservations about the safeguards. Moscow traditionally demands stricter safeguards than most Western suppliers other than the United States. In the current negotiations, we believe Moscow is demanding that the fuel and materials be safeguarded for the power plant, and that, if these materials are diverted to an unsafeguarded nuclear facility, safeguards will be applied to the latter. []

New Delhi could probably avoid stringent Soviet-style safeguards by purchasing reactors from France, but Paris cannot compete with the financial terms Moscow offers. Still, the two countries agreed in April to start joint projects in the nuclear energy field, and Indian scientists probably prefer French technology. []

India's serious consideration of Soviet reactors implies that New Delhi may be abandoning its traditional policy of indigenization and self-reliance in nuclear technology. If New Delhi buys the Soviet reactor, it will be dependent upon Soviet fuel at least until the DAE completes its planned uranium enrichment plant in southern India, optimistically scheduled to go on line in 1990. Although the Soviets agreed to use some Indian equipment and Indian technical personnel in the construction, Indian technicians will have to be specially trained, and the operation of the plant will be in Soviet hands for sometime. []

Benefits for Each Country

The Soviet Union undoubtedly expects propaganda returns from the new aid commitment. At a minimum, the package will dampen complaints that Moscow no longer has much of value to offer India. Some past credits have gone unused partly because Indian officials believe that Soviet industrial technology is inferior to that available in the West. With a slight increase in disbursements, the Soviet Union could become India's largest bilateral aid donor. []

Agreement on a nuclear power project would probably enhance Moscow's propaganda gains. The reactor would be the first constructed by the Soviet Union outside of Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Finland. It would also be located near the US-provided—but no longer supplied—Tarapur reactor and would serve as a silent reminder of the controversial US decision to halt support for India's nuclear program. []

For India, the benefits are primarily economic. The Soviet contribution adds to concessional aid commitments from other countries, and the terms are

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good—much cheaper than commercial borrowing or ordinary World Bank loans, though more expensive than borrowing from the International Development Association or bilateral grants. Energy projects will help ease electricity shortages, which are now a major constraint on India's overall growth. [redacted]

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These new economic aid projects, in our view, will not make India dependent on the Soviet Union or vulnerable to its political pressure. Even if Soviet aid disbursements increase substantially, Moscow's contribution will provide less than 10 percent of India's annual receipts of concessional aid, an even smaller share of total foreign borrowing, and less than 1 percent of Indian development expenditures. Concessional financing for military equipment—not included in the recent agreement—provides Moscow with far more potential leverage on Indian policy.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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**Afghanistan:
Alternatives to Babrak** []

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The failure of the Afghan Government and ruling party to deal effectively with the many problems caused by the insurgency, the unrepresentative nature of the government, and the popular hostility toward the Soviet forces have periodically sparked rumors that President Babrak Karmal will be replaced. There is no clear alternative within the Afghan leadership to Babrak, but we believe the likely candidates would include Prime Minister Keshtmand, Politburo member Nur Ahmad Nur, and intelligence service chief Najibullah []

The Soviets and Afghan party leaders would try to make the succession appear as orderly and legal as possible. Babrak holds two offices—chairman of the quasi-legislative Revolutionary Council (by virtue of which he is chief of state) and general secretary of the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party of Afghanistan. Ostensibly the Revolutionary Council would elect a new chairman from among its members, and the party's Central Committee would choose a new general secretary. The choice, however, would be made by the Soviets or by Afghan Communists working under close Soviet supervision. []

The replacement of Babrak would do little by itself to reduce the level of the insurgency, implement government programs, or solve the problem of factionalism in the ruling party. []

Leading Candidates

If death or physical disability brought an end to Babrak's tenure, the Soviets would probably try to minimize the effect on the Afghan regime and party by quickly installing a member of Babrak's Parcham faction. Rumors that Babrak is seriously ill have circulated widely in Kabul recently. []

If the Soviets decide to impose their succession practice, Babrak would be replaced by someone in the party Central Committee. Nur Ahmad Nur,

nominally the second most important Parchami, has been in "training" in Moscow for over a year, according to press reports. Recently, rumors circulating in Kabul have suggested that the Soviets may be grooming him as Babrak's successor. []

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Other Parchamis who might be in the running include:

- *Prime Minister Keshtmand.* His major disadvantage is his Hazara ethnic background. Hazaras have the lowest social and economic status in Afghanistan. 25X1
- *Najibullah, Director of KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service.* A Parchami with solid connections in the party and with the Soviets, he has a reputation for ruthlessness, and his appointment might cause widespread Khalqi defections. Although Najibullah is a full member of the Politburo, he is not on the Central Committee.
- *Mahmud Baryalai.* Babrak's brother, Baryalai is on the Central Committee and has been given some important domestic and foreign policy tasks. His selection might be opposed by more senior party members. [] 25X1

Khalqi officials offer other leadership options to Moscow. The Soviets have generally given evenhanded treatment to the factions, supporting Khalqi Interior Minister Gulabzoi and protecting the Khalqis from a large-scale Parchami purge. The Khalqis, moreover, control about 60 percent of the party membership, with particular strength in the middle ranks. []

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If the Soviets were to back the Khalqis, Gulabzoi, Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad, and Politburo members Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri and Saleh Mohammad Ziray would be among the candidates to replace Babrak. Ziray would be chosen if the Soviets followed their own practice of selecting the most senior party official from Khalqi ranks. Ziray is on the Central Committee and has demonstrated willingness to work with the Parchamis, though his recent removal from control of the National Fatherland Front suggests he is in some disfavor. The Soviets, however, may favor Interior Minister Gulabzoi, who is generally considered leader of the Khalqi faction since the former leader, Taraki's secret police chief Sarwari, was exiled to Mongolia as Afghanistan's ambassador. Soviet protection probably has been the main reason Gulabzoi has been able to resist Parchami efforts to gain control of the Interior Ministry. []

Several other figures along with Ziray might also be considered if popularity is an important factor in the choice. These would include Commerce Minister Mohammad Khan Jalalar, who is not a party member, and Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost, a technician who has had no role in unpopular domestic programs. None of these three—Ziray, Jalalar, or Dost—can be said to have much of a following within the party or regime. []

The Soviets are probably aware that, at best, only marginal improvement would result from installing one of these men. Most Afghans would regard them as Soviet puppets. They are less objectionable than Babrak only because they so far have not dealt with many of the issues that face a president. The odds are against anyone accomplishing much through the inefficient and often secretly disloyal Afghan civil service. Moreover, no one is likely to be able to reconcile the bitter differences between the Khalqis and Parchamis in the next several years. []

If the Party Is Replaced by a Coalition

The Soviets might form a coalition government either as part of a peace settlement or to try to win over part of the resistance. Such a government would lack credibility if headed by a Communist, so Moscow would presumably try to install a non-Communist

who believed that Kabul must have good relations with Moscow. Rumors in Kabul and among Afghans abroad about such a candidate have included former Prime Minister Yusuf, former King Zahir Shah, and his son-in-law Prince Abdul Wali. Because these figures represent the pre-Marxist era and because they are closely associated with the West, they would probably be unacceptable both to the Soviets and to the fundamentalist insurgent groups as a coalition leader, but one of them might be accepted as a coalition member. []

Public and private statements by these men and others who would give the coalition credibility make it doubtful that they would agree to serve without major Soviet concessions, including troop withdrawal. Some less well-known figures—such as former Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Sattar Shalizi, who has kept up contacts with both sides—might be more easily induced to serve, but most Afghans would probably consider them as having sold out to the Soviets. []

Given these factors, a relatively unknown figure would probably have to head any coalition. []

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Possible Successors to Babrak Karmal

Name	Post	Faction	Age	Comment
Soltan Ali Keshtmand	Politburo member, Prime Minister	Parchami	50	Hazara, nonpracticing Shia Muslim, longtime politician.
Nur Ahmad Nur	Politburo member and Secretary of Central Committee, Vice President of Revolutionary Council	Parchami	48	Former minister and ambassador, longtime ally of Babrak, now in USSR for "training."
Mohammad Rafi	Politburo member, Deputy Prime Minister	Parchami	40	Brigadier General, former Defense Minister, studied in USSR.
Dr. Najibullah	Politburo member, Director of KHAD (intelligence service)	Parchami	37	Studied medicine, former ambassador, vehemently anti-Khalq, promoted to Lieutenant General April 1983.
Mahmud Baryalai	Candidate member of Politburo and Secretary of Central Committee	Parchami	40	Babrak's brother, President of Central Committee International Relations Department.
Nazar Mohammad	Member of Central Committee, Minister of National Defense	Khalqi	57	Major General, military career, trained in USSR.
Salch Mohammad Ziray	Politburo member and Secretary of Central Committee	Khalqi	50s	Medical doctor, served under Taraki and Amin, former head of National Fatherland Front.
Shah Mohammad Dost	Member of Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs	Parchami	56	Longtime diplomat, not involved in domestic affairs.
Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi	Member of Central Committee, Minister of Interior	Khalqi	30s	Promoted to Major General April 1983, heads Khalqi faction, controls provincial police.
Mohammad Aslam Watanjar	Politburo member, Minister of Communications	Khalqi	39	Military career, key figure in 1978 coup.
Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri	Politburo member	Khalqi	52	Tajik, former Parchami, held Cabinet positions 1978-79.
Asadollah Sarwari	Member of Central Committee, Ambassador to Mongolia	Khalqi	40s	Removed from Politburo in 1981, former head of intelligence service, military officer, bitter opponent of Babrak.
Mohammad Yusuf	*	*	71	Prime Minister under King Zahir Shah, former ambassador, active in promoting resistance unity.
Mohammad Zahir Shah	*	*	70	King (1933-73), living in exile in Rome, possible unifying figure for resistance or compromise government.
Abdul Wali	*	*	61	Prince, first cousin and son-in-law of King, influential with King, unpopular with many Afghans.
Abdul Sattar Shalizi	*	*	69	Former Deputy Prime Minister, former Interior Minister, studied in United States, lived in Afghanistan 1981-82 after six years in United States.

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Medical Care for the Afghan Insurgents—An Update []

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Medical care for the insurgents remains poor, although an increase in the number of Afghan paramedics has resulted in some improvement in the last year.¹ European doctors remain a major source of care for the insurgents inside Afghanistan, and several US doctors have also worked inside Afghanistan since 1984 despite more aggressive Soviet military operations. []

Afghan Army defectors with rudimentary paramedical training have also joined insurgent groups, []

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Better clothing and equipment have helped reduce medical problems. Insurgents suffered from less frostbite last winter because more boots and parkas were available, []

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More Paramedics in Afghanistan

The number of paramedics serving the insurgents has increased over the past year. Red Cross officials in Pakistan told US diplomats in March that from October 1984 to February 1985 they had given about 1,250 Afghans a one-day first aid course and first aid kits and certified 79 Afghan paramedics who passed a four-week course. The two Afghan medical associations in Pakistan also gave a one-year course to almost 100 insurgents over the last 12 months, []

Despite this progress, Afghan insurgents and civilians still suffer from severe medical problems. []

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[] at least 40 percent of the Afghan population suffers from respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, and intestinal parasites. Many insurgents with moderate cuts or injuries become medical emergencies because of a lack of medical expertise and supplies. The insurgents commanded by Panjsher Valley leader Ahmad Masood—one of the best organized groups in Afghanistan—often lack gauze for bandages, vitamins to supplement poor diets, laboratory supplies, and X-ray machines, []

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[] In addition, small Western-, Pakistani-, and Arab-backed philanthropic organizations operating in the border area have begun paramedic training classes in Pakistan within the last year. Many of the students come from eastern Afghanistan and are chosen by various resistance groups. []

More Problems for European Doctors

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European doctors inside Afghanistan must deal with more aggressive Soviet military operations and better Soviet intelligence. []

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[] many of those trained may stay in Pakistan because it is safer. []

[] movement inside Afghanistan has become more dangerous because the Soviets are bombing the main infiltration routes more frequently. The director of *Medecins Sans Frontieres* says that Soviet intelligence began to improve in 1984 and that the Soviets, using local informers and reconnaissance aircraft, can now quickly locate French clinics. Bombing strikes occur shortly after Soviet planes spot the clinics. []

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Insurgent medical care has also improved because of training provided by European doctors working inside Afghanistan. The head of *Medecins Sans Frontieres*, the larger of two French-sponsored medical organizations with clinics in Afghanistan, told US officials that several Afghans learned to do surgical procedures from French doctors in the Panjsher Valley and treated wounded insurgents after a Soviet offensive drove the doctors out of the valley. Other Afghans have learned rudimentary medical skills, such as cleaning wounds, from European doctors, []

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Foreign Medical Organizations in Afghanistan

Both French organizations operating in Afghanistan, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and Medecins du Monde (MDM), are run by French personnel and probably are financed in part by the French Government. Slightly more than half their personnel, however, are from other European countries. Neither MSF nor MDM has had problems getting volunteers despite the increased difficulties of operating in Afghanistan. MSF has eight personnel in the Mazar-e Sharif area and seven personnel in Badakhshan. The MSF director says his organization prefers to operate in northern Afghanistan because the need there is greater. We also believe the MSF prefers to work there because the French Government has supported the area's Jamiat-i-Islami organization. []

MSF tries to keep the United States and Pakistan at arm's length. The MSF director told US officials in 1984 that he does not want US doctors on his medical teams because their presence would provoke the Soviets. He also believes close identification with the United States would alienate some Europeans. The director is certain that Pakistani officials know the MSF is operating out of Peshawar but believes the officials prefer not to be asked for formal permission to do so. []

West German medical personnel in Afghanistan are supported by Union Aid, a private Afghan organization that is given assistance by West German and Japanese parliamentary groups, and by the privately funded Bonn Afghanistan Committee, according to the US Embassy. []

The US-based International Medical Corps (IMC) was founded by an American doctor, Robert Simon, who spent six weeks in Afghanistan in 1984. The IMC has raised funds for Afghan medical care, brought its first Afghan doctor to the United States for six months of training in March 1985, and plans to open an office in Peshawar. []

Despite the increased danger, the overall number of European doctors has not declined significantly. Although the number of *Medecins Sans Frontieres* medical personnel has declined from 25 to 15 over the last year, [] the number of West German medical personnel has increased from one to 10. A second French-run organization, *Medecins du Monde*, still operates in Wardak Province, where conditions are relatively peaceful, but a third French-run organization, *Aide Medicale Internationale*, moved to Pakistan after one of its doctors was captured by the Soviets and held for several months in 1983. []

A New American Presence

Representatives of the US-based International Medical Corps say they have set up three or four clinics in Paktia Province since 1984, each of which is staffed by a US doctor and several Afghan doctors and paramedics. The director says his organization will continue to operate inside Afghanistan. Another International Medical Corps doctor briefly visited Panjsher Valley leader Ahmad Masood in May 1985. []

Outlook

We believe that medical care for the insurgents in Afghanistan will continue to improve. Insurgent leaders continue to send men to Pakistan for paramedical training, and those who have received training will train others. Training Afghans to teach other Afghans about rudimentary first aid and preventive medicine is, in our view, probably more effective than setting up medical facilities and distributing medicines. []

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Afghanistan in May [REDACTED]

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The Soviets launched their spring offensive in May with simultaneous operations in the Konar Valley near the Pakistani border; in Ghazni, Lowgar, and Paktia Provinces in the east; and in the south, west, and north as well. The Konar Valley campaign probably involved the largest number of heliborne troops and aircraft of any operation to date and succeeded in early June in opening a supply road to the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt, which had been under siege for several years. The operation also probably disrupted insurgent resupply efforts temporarily, but long-term success will be difficult for the Soviets to achieve because of the area's terrain and proximity to Pakistan. [REDACTED]

The Konar Valley Campaign

The Konar operation was the largest ground operation since the Panjsher campaign in April 1984. Reliable sources of the US Embassy report that more than 10,000 Soviet and Afghan troops supported by at least 1,000 combat vehicles including tanks, artillery, and multiple rocket launchers took part. The sources say that nearly all Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan were involved, although TU-16 bombers based in the Soviet Union did not participate as they did in the Panjsher operation. [REDACTED]

The offensive began in mid-May when Soviet ground forces moved up the Konar Valley from Jalalabad to Asadabad, located approximately halfway to the Afghan Army post at Barikowt, according to reliable US Embassy sources. The Soviets pushed northward to Asmar, approximately 30 kilometers south of Barikowt, by the end of May and reached Barikowt a week later. As the main force moved up the road in the valley, helicopters dropped troops above and behind insurgent positions in the mountainous terrain to block the insurgents' escape. Afghan Army forces were relegated to holding territory cleared by the advancing Soviets. Heavy Soviet bombing and artillery fire devastated parts of the upper Konar Valley. [REDACTED]

Most of the estimated 5,000 to 8,000 Konar insurgents, who are better armed than most insurgent groups because of their proximity to Pakistan, probably withdrew from the valley in the early stages of the offensive. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Operations in Other Areas

The Soviets conducted smaller operations elsewhere in Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources indicate that the Soviets cleared the Kabul-Gardez road and attacked insurgent positions in Lowgar, Paktia, and Nangahar Provinces. We believe the Soviets are continuing to emphasize operations in these provinces to block the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan. The Soviets also expanded their presence in Ghazni city and conducted several heliborne assaults among the surrounding villages, according to diplomatic sources. [REDACTED]

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The Soviets also attempted to disrupt insurgent supply routes in the south and west and were active in the north. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Soviet Spetsnaz units were involved in ambush actions against insurgent supply caravans in remote areas of Helmand and Qandahar Provinces. The Soviets appear to believe they have identified new infiltration routes west of Quetta from Pakistan into southwestern Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan troops also conducted a clearing operation against insurgent forces west of the Kajaki Dam, approximately 100 kilometers northeast of Lashkar Gah. The Afghan garrison at the Kajaki Dam has been under insurgent pressure since March. US Embassy sources say that [REDACTED]

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Soviet motorized rifle troops were also active around Shindand in the west and around Kholm in Samangan Province in northern Afghanistan. []

Cross-Border Strikes

[] the number of airstrikes against Pakistani territory did not increase significantly. [] aircraft from Afghanistan three times bombed Arandu on the Pakistani border, across from the Afghan Army garrison at Barikowt, and that a fourth attack occurred very near the border in Baluchistan. None of these attacks caused casualties. []

But an airstrike deeper inside Pakistani territory caused the largest number of casualties since January 1984. Eight aircraft killed about 11 civilians and wounded 30 others near Drosh about 25 kilometers inside Pakistani territory at the northern end of the Konar Valley on 31 May. []

[] We believe it was the second-deepest airstrike into Pakistani territory to date. []

Insurgent Initiatives

Sources of the US Embassy report that Afghan guerrillas attacked Soviet airfields at Shindand and Jalalabad. The insurgents now have a large number of 107-mm rockets, which allow them to attack targets from greater distances. We believe they will use them to step up their attacks on heavily patrolled targets such as airfields and prominent Soviet and regime installations. []

The insurgents were active in Herat and Qandahar.

[] insurgents set the governor's house on fire and harassed the Soviet and Afghan Army outposts that ring the city. []

[] the insurgents also harassed Afghan Army outposts and stripped a tank given to them by Afghan Army defectors. []

Untested US Embassy sources say that one helicopter crashed near Fayzabad in Badakhshan, two others crashed near Kabul, and a MIG-17 was downed in Nangarhar Province. The sources do not know if these planes were shot down or crashed because of malfunctions. []

Outlook

We believe the Konar operation probably will disrupt temporarily insurgent resupply efforts and force the guerrillas to find alternative and perhaps less accessible infiltration routes. But the Soviets are likely to find long-term success difficult to secure. Even if they establish permanent garrisons between Asadabad and Barikowt, they will be vulnerable to insurgent harassment. The Konar's difficult terrain will also make resupply difficult. []

The next phase of the Soviets' campaign may be a summer offensive against strategic areas further away from the border areas in which the resistance is strong, such as the Panjsher Valley. But large-scale operations against these areas would reduce significantly the forces that would be available to block infiltration routes from the borders. []

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Sudan:
John Garang De Mabior—
A Political Biography [redacted]


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Col. John Garang serves as chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and commander in chief of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. Garang was on vacation at his home in Bor, Upper Nile Region, when southern units mutinied in May 1983. The mutineers drafted him as their leader, and by the fall of 1983 he emerged as the most prominent leader of the southern dissident movement. Garang has excellent leadership qualities, is well respected in the Sudanese Army, and is admired throughout much of southern Sudan [redacted]



*John Garang De Mabior,
commander in chief of the
Sudanese People's Liberation
Army*

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Ideology and Political Goals

Garang and other SPLM leaders claim to seek a secular, unified, and socialist Sudan. They believe the country's African identity could provide a theme for national unity among Muslims, animists, and Christians. They strongly opposed former President Nimeiri's efforts to unify the country by imposing Islam and the Arabic language on the south. SPLM propaganda characterized the Nimeiri government as a minority "Arab clique," and it has rejected the reconciliation efforts of the new government in Khartoum, calling its military leaders "Nimeiri's government without Nimeiri." [redacted]

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In our judgment, Garang's intention to "liberate" the entire country appears genuine, although it has also pleased his former Libyan and continuing Ethiopian sponsors. He has shown a willingness to find common cause with northern opposition elements. Garang probably reasons that an independent southern Sudan would be only a last resort because it would be politically and economically unviable. SPLM leaders

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publicly acknowledge they favor socialism but have denied charges that they are Communists. The SPLM's manifesto of July 1983, its other publications, and its radiobroadcasts have failed to convey a coherent socialist ideology. The upturn in Marxist rhetoric in SPLM radiobroadcasts following the ouster of Nimeiri in early April may have reflected closer control by Ethiopia. Garang has generally tried to avoid using Marxist rhetoric that would alienate many of his followers. [redacted]

Reconciliation

Garang's refusal to negotiate with Khartoum's interim government raises the issue of whether he is a free agent or is controlled by the Ethiopians, especially since the apparent recent suspension of economic and military aid from Libya. The SPLA's increased reliance on its Ethiopian sponsors at this stage cannot be denied. In addition, Addis Ababa probably hopes to maintain Garang as a negotiating lever for ending Khartoum's alleged support for Ethiopian insurgents. Still, there are other sides to Garang's intransigence:

- He believes Khartoum's current military leaders undercut the real "revolution" and that their policies will not deviate from Nimeiri's. Garang may reason that, as long as he keeps his 6,000 to 10,000 men mobilized, he can be a guarantor of the return to civilian rule. In addition, he probably believes that the current military leadership will not last, and, therefore, he must wait for their "inevitable" overthrow by younger officers before negotiating seriously on the south.
- Garang originally had set forth three main conditions for ending the insurgency: restoration of the south's unified status (recently done by the new government), withdrawal of Islamic law, and the cancellation of the integration agreement with Egypt.

- If and when Garang decides to negotiate, he will not be as easily bought as past southern dissident leaders who were given honorific titles in a new government. In addition to his original conditions, he nonetheless will demand good positions in the government or the military for himself and his subordinates. He will also insist on some sort of federal system for the entire country, profit sharing for the south from its oil and water development projects, and central government support for development and social services in the south. [redacted]

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